Pay for delay settlements are currently high on the competition law enforcement agenda in the pharmaceutical sector. The focus in these investigations is on the collusive nature of the agreements between a brand company and generic companies and the associated anticompetitive potential. However, this article moves the discussion away from the commonly recognized collusive anticompetitive potential, advocating for the expansion of antitrust scrutiny of pay for delay settlements to unilateral conduct. It argues that pay for delay settlements could be used as a "facilitator" for a broader unilateral strategy by the brand company such as product hopping -the intentional or even coercive switch of patients to a reformulated version of the original brand drug in anticipation of generic drug competition.
Introduction
Agreements in the pharmaceutical sector by which the brand pharmaceutical company pays the generic entrant to stay off the market as part of a patent settlement, so-called pay for delay On 8 September 2016, the General Court upheld the European Comission's decision in Lunbeck in its entirely, finding pay for delay settlements to be a restriction by object. 4 On a national level, the Competition and Markets Authority has issued its first pay for delay infringement decision against GlaxoSmithKline and a number of generic companies in Foreclosure purely based on the pay for delay settlement's collusive nature is only possible in concentrated markets where the brand company is able to pay off all viable generic entrants.
Therefore, this article moves away from the common understanding that the anticompetitive harm of pay for delay settlements can only be caused by collusive behaviour and argues that these kind of agreements can also facilitate unilateral anticompetitive conduct by the brand company, such as product hopping.
It is recognized in the literature that the brand company can evade the threat of cheaper generic competition which would decrease its profits significantly and at the same time would benefit the consumers greatly, by establishing a "new" version of the brand drug on the market prior to generic competition. 8 In the past, this kind of product hopping was facilitated by regulatory peculiarities that were exploited by the undertakings, as in AstraZeneca 9 or in the CMA's Reckitt Benckiser decision. 10 Using a pay for delay settlement as a facilitator for unilateral conduct such as product hopping instead, provides the brand company with a lot more 'flexibility' as it is no longer reliant on regulatory loopholes that can be closed by means of legislative reform. In essence, a pay for delay settlement provides the brand company with the potential to "buy" sufficient time to safely switch to a new version of its drug at the latest possible time without having to fear generic competition that would impede such conduct. The topicality of this issue can be highlighted by internal Lundbeck documents that have been discovered during the European Commission's investigation against the company in relation to pay for delay settlements.
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Before the article sets out the proposed theory of harm and establishes that the finding of an abuse of a dominant position would be consistent with the previous product hopping cases, it is setting the scene. It first addresses the reduced anticompetitive potential of collusive pay for delay settlements in Europe when compared to the United States and suggests to broaden the scrutiny of these kind of settlements as part of a unilateral strategy of the brand company.
Secondly, the article defines product hopping before it critically assesses two prominent European product hopping cases; the second abuse in AstraZeneca, and the UK CMA's decision in Reckitt Benckiser. Having done so, the article then turns to the discussion of pay for delay settlements as facilitator for unilateral conduct by brand companies; developing the theory of harm and arguing that that such conduct should not be able to be justified by the fact that the product hop is facilitated by a patent settlement, allegedly reducing litigation cost and increasing legal certainty.
EU pay for delay settlement in a broader unilateral context
Competition law scrutiny of pay for delay settlements focuses predominantly on the anticompetitive nature of the agreement between the parties and the possible infringement of should not be easily dismissed; especially, considering the fundamental differences between the pharmaceutical regulations in the United States and Europe. In order to develop a unilateral theory of harm based on pay for delay settlements, this section first introduces and briefly discusses the differences between the two respective regimes, which in turn has a significant impact on the anticompetitive potential that can arise from pay for delay settlements individually.
It is widely accepted in the academic literature and amongst policy makers that pay for delay settlements are used as a vehicle to foreclose a relevant market by paying off potential generic entrants. 13 In return for a certain value transfer from the brand company to the potential generic entrant, the generic entrant agrees not to enter the market before a certain date that has 12 FTC v. Actavis 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013 . 13 See fn 6 been stipulated in the settlement agreement. 14 It can therefore be argued that the generic exclusion from the market is caused by value transfer rather than by the exclusionary nature of a valid patent. A value transfer from the brand company to the generic entrant would normally only be expected, if the parties to the settlement regard the patent in question as invalid.
Consequently one would expect generic entry and the potential payment of damages and litigation cost by the brand company. However, following a pay for delay settlement, the potential generic entrant asserts the validity of the patent. Nonetheless, the generic company receives payment from the brand company. Assuming the patent would be valid and enforceable, a value transfer from the brand company to the potential generic entrant would not be necessary to achieve the exclusion. The payment thus arguably goes in the "wrong direction".
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The anticompetitive potential of this conduct does not arise from the settlement itself but rather the regulatory environment in which it takes place. In the United States, the regulatory framework is based on the so-called Hatch Waxman Act. 16 According to this framework, a generic company can apply for drug approval with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prior to the expiry of the brand company's patent as long as the generic company notifies the brand company about its intended entry. This notification is achieved through a so-called "Paragraph IV certification" which needs to list all related patents that have been filed by the brand company with the FDA in its "Orange Book". 17 This Orange Book requirement creates a patent linkage between the FDA's consideration of the drug's safety and efficacy and the related economic considerations stemming from patent protection. 18 The 'Paragraph IV certification' also allows the brand company to challenge the generic application on grounds of patent infringement, as the generic application constitutes an act of patent infringement. 19 Should the brand company decide to do so, the FDA decision on the generic application is postponed by 30 months in order to allow the parties to resolve their patent 102 TFEU and could use its discretion to drop the Art. 101 TFEU proceedings against the generic company in return for their cooperation. 29 This is also not likely to be an undue 26 Gallasch (n 7) 10. 27 Product lifecycle management is the business activity of managing a company's products across their lifecycle, from the very first idea of a product all the way through until it's retired and disposed of. The main objectives are the increase of product revenue, the reduction of product related costs, and the maximisation of the product portfolio's value for customers and shareholders. John Stark, Product lifecycle management: 21st century paradigm for product realisation (Decision engineering, 2nd Springer, London, New York 2011) 1. 29 The European Commission not only has the discretion to decide how to conduct its investigation but also can decide only focus in its infringement decision only on a part of the case, so only on the unilateral of the brand company instead of the collusive behaviour. prioritization of the enforcement, as the investigated conduct is based on unilateral strategy that has been facilitated by the agreement between the brand company and the generic company.
For example, assume that the pay for delay and product hop take place one year prior to the expiry of the patent. In this scenario the European Commission would have the choice to investigate all parties to the pay for delay settlement under Art. 101 TFEU with the potential anticompetitive harm being the delay of generic competition for one year; or it could investigate the brand company for unilateral product hopping which was facilitated by the pay for delay settlement with the potential anticompetitive harm being the delay of generic competition for several years due to the "renewed" brand exclusivity of the follow-on drug.
This example nicely illustrates thatthe predominant anticompetitive potential stems form the brand company's unilateral conduct and not the pay for delay settlement itself. Due to the different focal point, an investigation of a brand company's abuse of dominance should therefore be seen as an alternative enforcement strategy against conduct that rely on pay for delay settlements rather than a complementary approach to the analysis of pay for delay settlements under Art. 101TFEU.
An example for such broader unilateral conduct by the brand company that goes beyond the competitive practice of "product lifecycle management" is the "second" abuse in AstraZeneca, concerning the deregistration of a market authorization in order to avoid generic entry and to facilitate AstraZeneca's product switch to a second generation version of its brand drug Losec. This type of conduct has also been referred to as 'product hopping'.
In the remainder of this article it is argued that an adapted version of this conduct, in which the deregistration of the marketing authorization is replaced by a pay for delay settlement can lead to the similar anticompetitive result and therefore should be regarded as an abuse of the brand company's dominant position. Before this article turns to the discussion of whether product hopping could be facilitated by a pay for delay settlement, constituting an infringement of Art.
102 TFEU, it first explains the phenomenon of product hopping and critically analyses the European Courts' approach to this phenomenon in the 'second' abuse of the AstraZeneca judgment as well as the CMA's decision in Reckitt Benckiser.
Product hopping defined and explained
Product hopping is an exclusionary strategy involving the brand company's reformulation of its brand drug. 30 These reformulations can take place in different ways. The brand company might decide to change the form of the drug, switching from a capsule to a tablet or injectable.
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Another possibility is to slightly change the chemical composition of the drug, while keeping the actual active ingredient the same. 32 Alternatively, the brand company might also combine two or more pharmaceutical compositions in a single drug that used to be marketed separately. 33 Although brand companies always claim that these 'second generation' drugs are an improvement to the original drug, the clinical benefit of these improvements is sometimes at least questionable. drug can be marketed, if it has already been approved, but it cannot be substituted for the second generation brand drug, as it lacks in bioequivalence. 38 If the original brand drug would be withdrawn from the market, the generic company might have to forgo entering the market, as it would no longer be considered as a substitute for the second generation drug. 39 Alternatively, the generic company could consider to reapply for generic approval of the second generation drug. 40 However, such a re-application might be prevented by the data and marketing exclusivity period which has been granted to the second generation drug, in case the brand company has obtained additional patents. The brand company will try to switch as many consumers as possible to the new second generation drug that is still patent protected, as it will incur considerable value losses both in terms of smaller volumes and reduced prices, if cheaper, generic versions of the first product come on the market before or simultaneously with the switch to the follow-on product. 41 Physicians or pharmacists would not be allowed to provide already switched patients with the generic substitute for the original brand drug. So, even if the original brand drug is not withdrawn from the market, the negative impact is likely to be significant for the generic entrant's revenue but also more importantly for consumer welfare, as consumers are deprived of cheaper generic choices.
Competition law scrutiny of this product hopping strategy should thus focus not necessarily on the product switch itself but rather on the brand company's behaviour that ensures the successful switch by facilitating the timing of the switch prior to generic entry or by exploiting pharmaceutical regulation to deter generic substitution. The product switch itself should rather be seen as trigger for increased competition law vigilance, if the switch takes place a few years prior to patent expiry. Examples of such conduct are the deregistration of marketing authorizations in AstraZeneca and the withdrawal of Gaviscon Original from the NHS sales channels in Reckitt Benckiser.
Product hopping facilitated by regulatory gaming
38 This means that the generic company must establish that the generic product is composed of the same substances -in qualitative and quantitative terms -and has the same pharmaceutical form as the originator product which has already been granted marketing authorisation. Having defined product hopping and explained the underlying intuition of its anticompetitive potential, the article now discusses the rationale behind the abuse in AstraZeneca and in Reckitt
Benckiser.
In AstraZeneca, the product hopping was achieved by the selective deregistration of marketing authorizations for AstraZeneca's brand drug Losec. The European Commission's finding of abuse was based on AstraZeneca's so-called "Losec-Post-Patent-Strategy" which consisted of three elements: (1) The abuse is therefore not to be found in the extension of the product line and the product switching itself, but in the delay of generic competition into the market. 48 This delay allowed the brand company to introduce a follow-on brand drug and attempt to switch as many patients as possible to the new follow-on brand drug. Where successful the brand drug would not face significant competitive pressure from generic entrants as these could only enter with generic version for the brand drug but not for the follow-on brand drug, which is effectively replacing the brand drug on the same market. for the use of the copyright protected "brick structure" by a competitor. 52 The possibility to request the deregistration of a marketing authorization was also not deemed to be an equivalent to an exclusive property whose exercise could be justified as a means of 'effective expropriation'. 53 The Court held that after the expiry of the relevant period of data exclusivity, the clinical data is regarded to be in the public domain, allowing generic applicants for the same drug to rely on this data for marketing authorization purposes. 54 In fact, AstraZeneca's conduct rendered the abridged application procedure for generic applicants unavailable solely for the purpose to create barriers to entry for generic applicants and to delay such entry, thus constituting an abuse of AstraZeneca's dominant position.
In Reckitt Benckiser, the brand company had successfully marketed the acid reflux drug Gaviscon for years and had also introduced a second generation version of the drug, called Gaviscon Advance. In order to facilitate the prescription of the follow-on drug, Reckitt
Benckiser delisted the original drug Gaviscon from the NHS sales channels -again, conduct that the company was entitled to under the law. 55 However the withdrawal led to the situation that physicians no longer had the choice between prescribing Gaviscon and Gaviscon Advance using their IT system. Even more importantly, prescribing physicians could no longer successfully search for generic alternatives for Gaviscon by hitting "Ctrl +G". Internal documentation referring to project "White Tiger" further highlighted Reckitt
Benckiser's intention to strategically use the withdrawal of Gaviscon to pre-empt 'the publication of a generic name corresponding to Gaviscon, and to ensure that the NHS Gaviscon portfolio was not exposed to the full generic competition associated with the widespread issuing of open prescriptions;' 57 meaning prescriptions using the generic drug name which allow the pharmacist choose the cheapest generic version available.
As in the case of AstraZeneca, timing was of the essence. The withdrawal of Gaviscon needed to be completed before a generic name for Gaviscon was granted. The importance of this timing and the associate risk can again be illustrated by internal documentation referring to Project White Tiger stating that,
'If we do not act Peptac will be in a position to take control of the UK Alginates market and our entire Gaviscon NHS franchise will be under threat. It is imperative that we maintain control of our own destiny and do not allow the competition to dictate the future of one of RB's power brands.' 58
Similar to AstraZenca, Reckitt Benckiser was running a two stage strategy, (1) the introduction of a follow-on drug and (2) the timely withdrawal of the original drug which which was aimed at doing 'everything possible to encourage [phyisicians] and pharmacists to upgrade patients to Gaviscon Advance instead'.
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The CMA regarded the deletion of Gaviscon from the NHS prescription list as conduct outside the scope of competition on the merits and thus a restriction of competition -directly referring to the AstraZeneca decision. 60 The authority rejected Reckitt Benckiser's argument that it has always intended to convert sales from Gaviscon to Gaviscon Advance as part of its normal "life cycle management strategy". 61 In fact, the conversion of sales is not by itself anticompetitive or "outside" normal competition. It is rather the combination of the switch and the timing of the withdrawal, which was at the time a loss-making decision and therefore irrational absence the ulterior motive of hindering the ascendancy of generic competition.
62
What both cases have in common, is the fact that the anticompetitive conduct is not the product switch as such but rather the combination of the product switch with the exploitation of the regulatory framework that facilitated the switch. However, at the same time, the necessity of having to rely on highly specific regulatory loopholes is also the "downside" of this kind conduct. The very abuse might work once, but the loophole is likely to be closed swiftly by means legislative reform, as in AstraZeneca. 
Product hopping facilitated by pay for delay settlements
However, relying on a pay for delay settlement in order to facilitate product hopping instead of having to rely on pharmaceutical regulation and a specific regulatory loophole, allows brand companies to achieve the same goal. Furthermore, the use of pay for delay settlements makes the 'anticompetitive' product hopping strategy a lot more flexible for the brand company.
Increased flexibility for potential anticompetitive conduct should generally lead to increased competition law scrutiny.
a. Theory of harm
The theory of harm centres on the brand company's delay of generic competition that allows it to switch patients from a soon-out-of-patent-protection drug to a patent protected follow-on drug without the need for any notable therapeutic improvement as it does not have to fear any 62 ibid. para. 6.136. It is now sufficient that the brand drug has received marketing authorisation for its drug at some point in the past, so that the authorisation does no longer have to be active at the time of the generic application.
competitive pressure. Ultimately, consumers are deprived of the choice between the branded follow-on drug and the generic version of the original brand drug.
It is known to be vital for the brand company to introduce the follow-on brand drug on the market before generic competition for the original brand drug arises. 64 The introduction of a follow-on brand drug does not constitute an abuse itself. After all, the drug could constitute an improvement from the original brand drug and should be seen as part of the normal competitive process to mitigate the erosion of sales. 65 If the follow-on drug would be a real improvement over the original drug, consumers would switch to the follow-on drug despite a generic presence in the market. This can be regarded as a good indicator to measure the level of improvement of the follow-on drug over the original 66 and is a reason for why the product switch itself should not be an abuse. It allows the consumer "to vote with their feet" by choosing the drug that is most beneficial to them.
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It would be a legitimate attempt to switch patients to the follow-on drug by introducing the follow-on brand drug to market after the brand company's data exclusivity has lapsed but before the 2-year period of market exclusivity has expired. 68 During this period, the brand company does not have to fear generic competition, as generic companies are allowed to develop and produce the generic version, however, cannot market it yet. Although the brand company might argue that this could lead to the cannibalization of profits 69 from the original brand drug that is still patent protected, one should always take into consideration that the follow-on brand drug is likely to be still under data exclusivity and is thus shielded from generic competition for a longer period.
The combination of a product switch with a pay for delay settlement could however turn the generally 'procompetitive product switch' into an 'anticompetitive product hop'. Drawing an analogy with AstraZeneca, a pay for delay settlement could replace the closed loophole of deregistration in the product switching scenario in AstraZeneca. As it has been discussed above pay for delay settlements in the European context do not necessarily provide the brand company with the opportunity to foreclose the market by paying off a single generic competitor. The foreclosure of the relevant market depends heavily on the competitive structure of the market and the number of generic companies that are capable of entering in the market and of posing a viable threat to the brand company's monopoly profits.
The brand company could, nonetheless, attempt to delay the most viable and imminent entrant by a pay for delay settlement in order to gain sufficient time to introduce the follow-on brand drug on the same market as the brand drug. The settlement could ensure that the brand company can introduce the follow-on brand drug on the market without the fear of generic competition and can attempt to switch as many patients to from the original brand drug to the new follow-on brand drug at a later stage than under the normal competitive process, even after the expiry of the marketing exclusivity period.
In contrast to the procompetitive product switch, the brand company delays generic entry by paying off the generic company to a point in time after the expiry of market exclusivity. This has a number of implications. (1) Under normal circumstances the paid-off generic company could have potentially entered the market providing consumers with a drug choice based on the therapeutic benefit. With generic competition in the market, the switch of patients would be less likely to be successful on a large scale or would have to be undertaken prior to the expiry of the marketing exclusivity period. This is the case as patients would be more likely to be switched to the generic version of the original brand drug than to the followon brand drug due to the significant price erosion that is associated with generic entry.
Consumers would have been likely to switch to the cheaper generic version of the original brand drug than to the follow-on brand drug, assuming the follow-on drug is of limited therapeutic benefit. (2) The product hop is also based on the intentional delay of generic alternatives rather than the actual improvement of the follow-on drug. 70 In fact, meaningful therapeutic improvement is not required due to the lack of generic alternatives. (3) Furthermore, the generic delay could also lead to the minimization of the aforementioned profit cannibalization as the successful product switch takes place at a point in time when the generic company could have already exerted competitive pressure on the original brand drug, which would directly benefit consumers. The brand company could thus switch consumers to the follow-on drug not only safely, but also at the latest point in time possible; close to the end of the patent life instead of the end of the marketing exclusivity period. In essence, the brand 70 See Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v European Commission (n 9) para. 130.
company gains the 'best of both worlds'; near optimal profits from for the original brand drug and the safe consumer switch to the still patent protected follow-on drug.
This theory of harm finds support in the recent Second Circuit decision in People of the State of New York vs. Acatvis. 71 In this decision the court upheld a preliminary injunction sought by the New York Attorney General against Actavis and its subsidiary Forest Laboratories in relation to the product hop from Namenda IR, an Alzheimer drug, to Namenda XR, the extended release version that only needs to be taken once a day instead of twice. The court distinguished between a "soft switch" and a "hard switch". Where as "soft switch" concerns the introduction of a second-generation drug followed by the attempt to persuade patients to switch, the "hard switch" describes the scenario in which the new drug is introduced and patients are coerced into the switch due to the withdrawal of the original drug. Importantly, the court held that "neither product withdrawal nor product improvement alone is anticompetitive, Ct. 2223 Ct. , 2231 Ct. (2013 that "patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the scope of the patent monopoly-and consequently antitrust law immunity-that is conferred by a patent," the court held that the introduction of the new drug in combination with the withdrawal of the old drug in the context of the state's drug substitution law goes beyond the scope of the patent protection conferred by the individual patents for Namenda IR and Namenda XR. ibid. 53. 74 The court held that the alleged superior nature of the new drug would not be significant in this case, as the anticompetitive conduct in question originates from the coercive nature of the conduct of forcing patients to switch by withdrawing the original drug. In doing so, the court seems to have taken into careful consideration concerns voiced by a number of academics in relation to a potential antitrust inquiry into the degree or even necessity of the product innovation that led to the drug improvement of the follow-on drug. 77 Moreover, the court's judgment suggests that the brand company is not forced to keep producing the original drug, indefinitely, alongside the follow-on drug, putting an additional burden on the company. This can be inferred from the fact that the court upheld the injunction, which required Actavis to produce the original brand drug for a mere 30 days post generic.
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It can be derived from this discussion that the court's reasoning is in line with the general premise of the decisions by the ECJ and the CMA, 79 providing robustness to the proposed theory of harm.
75 The court rejected the "free-riding" argument as this kind of conduct in the context of the pharmaceutical sector was expressly granted by law; in fact accepting the argument would have contradicted the purpose of the Hatch Waxman Act, which allows generic competitors to rely on the brand company's clinical data in an abbreviated drug application. b. Pay for delay has the same effect as regulatory gaming
Although the potential anticompetitive effect from the proposed theory of harm would be generally very similar to the ones discussed above, one has to consider the differences in the means by which the anticompetitive effect is achieved. Whereas the product switching in the previous cases was facilitated by an abuse of the regulatory procedure that was deemed to be outside the scope of competition on the merits, the product switch in the proposed theory of harm is facilitated by pay for delay settlements which could also be regarded as a patent settlement between the brand company as intellectual property proprietor and a generic company that intends to enter the market prior to patent expiry. The settlement could thus be regarded as a justified means by the brand company to protect its intellectual property right and investment as well as to ensure its effective expropriation. After all, the generic company wants to gain market entry prior to patent expiry. It could also be argued that the settlement generally lowers risk and increases certainty, thereby increasing investment.
Yet, it has to be kept in mind that pay for delay settlements are no ordinary patent settlements.
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The settlement is not based on the validity of the patent but rather on the value transfer from the brand company to the potential generic entrant. It would not be necessary for the brand company to make a substantial value transfer to the generic entrant, if its patent would be strong and valid. In this case, the generic entrant should be deterred from entry by the patent itself.
Even if one would accept that the proprietor can enforce its patent in any way as long as the patent is not yet expired one has to consider the underlying nature of the intellectual property right. Intellectual property policy does not confer an unfettered "right to exclude" but rather the right to "try to exclude". A pay for delay settlement is thus not part of the normal competitive process and infringes competition law.
In addition, one also needs to take a step back and remember that the pay for delay settlement in this scenario is only part of a broader unilateral strategy. The anticompetitive effect is not caused by the conclusion of the settlement with the potential generic entrant. It is rather achieved by the product switching to an incremental follow-on drug facilitated by a "plus factor" that enables the switch without having to fear any generic competition at a period of time at which generic competition is possible from a pharmaceutical regulation perspective,
i.e. after the expiry of marketing exclusivity. Whereas in AstraZeneca, the "plus factor" was the abuse of the deregistration procedure, and in Reckitt Benckiser the withdrawal of the drug from NHS sales channel, the "plus factor" in this theory of harm is the pay for delay settlement that makes the product switching fall outside the scope of competition on the merits. Attempts to justify the conduct based the need to protect an intellectual property right or its effective expropriation in order to legitimately protect an investment should be rebutted.
As already alluded to earlier, the brand company should not be able to rely on the exclusionary nature of the patent, arguing that it should be allowed to defend its patent by means of patent infringement litigation, also when the litigation is concluded by a settlement. 87 88 However, Microsoft's plea that it would be allowed to refuse to grant access to its technology to third parties based on the fact that the technology was patent protected was rejected by the General Court. The Court held that this would lead to the conclusion that refusal to licence an intellectual property right could never constitute an abuse, which would contradict the ECJ's judgments in Magill and IMS Health.
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In the similar vein it could be argued that it should not be allowed to shield any patent enforcement from competition law scrutiny because of the exclusionary nature of the patent. 90 Furthermore, arguments that the conduct would reduce the incentive to innovate should be rejected. Contrary to Microsoft which dealt with the refusal to licence an intellectual property right, the brand company is not curtailed in putting an innovative product to the market or is forced to provide a generic company with a licence. Instead, the company is prevented from shielding the market from generic competition, which allows the brand company to make the transition from an original brand drug to a follow-on brand drug without any competitive constraint from generic companies. The brand company should also not be able to argue that the pay for delay settlement which facilitates the product switch would realize efficiencies to the benefit of the consumers, as the main purpose of a pay for delay settlement is to keep cheaper generic alternatives to the original brand drug off the market.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that pay for delay deals can bring rise to unilateral, as well as bilateral anticompetitive outcomes and that scrutiny of pharmaceutical antitrust should be widened accordingly. Pay for delay settlement should not only trigger competition law scrutiny with a focus on collusive conduct between the brand company and the generic company or companies.
Instead, pay for delay settlements could be used as a means to an end for the brand company In the author's opinion such conduct warrants increased scrutiny, as product hopping facilitated by a pay for delay settlement is not constrained by the need to exploit a regulatory loophole, which makes the implementation of such conduct more flexible for the brand company. Yet, from an enforcement perspective, there is also good news. The detection rate of such conduct should be high. Competition authorities should start investigating, if they observe a product switch towards the end of a patent life in combination with a potential pay for delay settlement.
91 Lundbeck (n 1) para 808.
